ABSTRACT. This article explores the politics of malaria eradication in Argentina during the first government of Juan D. Perón. The article develops the theme of historical convergence to understand the rapid mobilization and success of the climactic battle against malaria in Northwest Argentina. The nearly complete eradication of malaria in Argentina resulted from a combination of three factors. First, Carlos Alvarado, the director of Argentina's Malaria Service, had already developed a solid but flexible organizational base that allowed a dramatic change in control strategy. Second, an infusion of new technologies, especially DDT but also motor vehicles, was instrumental. Lastly, a radical reorientation of national public health policy in the 1940s, under the direction of Perón and his health minister, Ramón Carrillo, encouraged eradication. These figures embraced and refashioned long-standing organicist ideologies that hitched the strength of the nation-state to the health and vigor of its ordinary citizens. This ideological orientation was reflected in bold, populist political strategies that showcased swift, massive, and expensive public health campaigns, including malaria eradication. In the conclusion, the article explores the ambiguous connections between malaria eradication and an ecological perspective on
the disease. KEYWORDS: malaria, Argentina, DDT, eradication, ecology, public health. "The year 1945 will have historical importance in the fight against anopheles, since in that year one era ends and another begins. Those who write the history of malaria in the future will be able to say: before 1945 and after 1945; which is the same as saying before DDT and after DDT." -Carlos Alberto Alvarado, address to the Fourth International Congresses on Tropical Medicine and Malaria, Washington, DC, 1948 1 W ITH these words, Carlos Alvarado, the director of Argentina's malaria eradication program, captured the heady enthusiasm of malaria fighters in the postwar era. This attitude was almost universal: the chemical insecticide DDT, which had become widely available after the end of World War II, provided a new and qualitatively different weapon against malaria. With the "magic bullet" of DDT, at last there was the means of not simply keeping malaria under control, but of eradicating it from the countries where it was endemic. But for most people in Argentina, 1945 was a watershed year for another reason. That year, the populist army general Juan D. Perón rose to power and brought sweeping changes to national politics, economy, society, and culture. Inspired in part by Mussolini's fascism, Perón's governing ideology of justicialismo combined displays of military power, nationalist sentiment, and concern for social justice.
With the able and loyal assistance of his minister of public health, Ramón Carrillo, Perón's administration made health, sanitation, and social welfare integral elements of the governing ideology. They immediately realized the long-frustrated project of centralizing national authority over public health and made a strong commitment to improving the welfare of the masses through a comprehensive hospital construction program, the establishment of a national social security system, and aggressive campaigns against infectious diseases. One of the most dramatic manifestations of this spirited new state attitude toward public health was the great campaign to eradicate malaria, launched in 1947. Thanks to Perón's expansion of public health policy, Carlos Alvarado finally had the financial resources, authority, and political backing to make significant progress against malaria. Before DDT, after DDT; before Perón, after Perón: for malaria control in Argentina, 1945 represented an unexpected and decisive convergence of the technological and the political.
In this article, I develop this theme of historical convergence to understand the rapid mobilization and success of the climactic battle against malaria in Northwest Argentina. The nearly complete eradication of malaria in Argentina resulted from a combination of three factors: the effective organization of the malaria campaign that Alvarado had developed before the advent of DDT; an infusion of new technologies, especially DDT but also motor vehicles; and lastly, the expansive public health ideology and policy that Perón and Carrillo developed. Each of these was a necessary ingredient, but none was sufficient on its own to effect the eradication of the disease.
As I have noted elsewhere, during the 1930s Alvarado revitalized a moribund Malaria Service.
2 By redesigning the agency's administrative structure, relocating its headquarters to the endemic zone, and training full-time technical personnel, Alvarado constructed a solid base that facilitated a dramatic shift in control strategy. DDT was the key technological element that enabled this change in strategy. The seemingly miraculous potential of the new insecticide prompted this turn, yet ancillary technologies, such as motor vehicles, were also vital to the new phase of the campaign. To carry out the DDT spraying program required an ambitious infusion of state financial resources, as well as an increase in state authority and support for public health. In a provident coincidence, DDT became universally and economically available at almost exactly the same time as Perón's ascent to power, around the end of World War II.
First, the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) returned to Argentina beginning in 1941, after a twelve-year absence; this time, the Foundation's purview was more expansive, reaching beyond the issue of malaria and hookworm control. As internal memoranda of the RF indicate, leaders of the Foundation were convinced that its activities in countries such as Argentina could act as a bulwark against the fascist penetration of South America. 5 The RF expanded its scope beyond public health to include promotion of the humanities and social sciences in South America, through grants for building institutional capacity and promoting scholarly exchanges with the U.S. Similarly, the emphasis of the International Health Division shifted from demonstration projects and research on vector-borne diseases towards making broader improvements in medical education and basic medical research in South American countries.
6 Through grants and scholarships, the RF hoped to increase the influence of the U.S. on the development of medical researchers, at the expense of Europe.
7
To promote this new vision, in 1941 the RF established the Rio de la Plata and Andean regional office of the International Health Division in Buenos Aires, to oversee RF activities in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. 8 Lewis W. Hackett, who had distinguished himself as an RF malariologist in Italy, directed the Buenos Aires office from its inception until 1949. He became the leading administrator of the RF's projects throughout the region. Although Hackett was not officially involved in Argentina's malaria campaign, he nonetheless made frequent trips to the Northwest region, to advise, converse with, and learn from his friend Carlos Alvarado. Hackett also created and supervised malaria control programs in the other countries under his watch, and shared these experiences with Alvarado. During this time, Hackett kept a highly detailed officer's diary, and his candid commentary offers a valuable outsider's view on science, politics, and culture in Argentina during a decade of great turmoil.
9
Though Hackett had a productive relationship with Alvarado, interactions between the RF and the Argentine government were fraught with tension.
There is another important element of the international situation to consider: the aftermath of World War II, and the technologies and institutions that it produced. The war became the proving ground for the insecticide DDT, and because of these origins and its destructive force, a strong rhetorical connection between warfare and DDT was created. As Edmund Russell has argued, chemical warfare gave rise to modern insecticides, and in the post-WWII era, pest control became a veritable "war on nature," both materially and metaphorically.
10 These bellicose associations appealed to Argentina and other Latin American states where the influence of the military in politics and culture was expanding. At the same time, the aftermath of World War II witnessed the founding of UNICEF and the World Health Organization, both of which would become deeply involved in the organization of malaria eradication efforts around the world.
11
Meanwhile, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) took on much greater prominence after the war, thanks in part to increased U.S. interest and funding.
12 In many ways, these institutions would adopt the roles that private philanthropies, especially the RF, were gradually abandoning. Through international conferences and publications sponsored by such organizations, a more fluid and rapid exchange of techniques and technologies of malaria control developed, and what had been separated, nationallevel programs were increasingly orchestrated at an international level. Carlos Alvarado was an active and influential participant in this international network, and even more so after malaria had been effectively eradicated from Argentina.
This article makes important contributions to understanding the global history of malaria science and malaria control. For one, it rejects the technological determinism characteristic of many histories of malaria eradication in the postwar era.
13 While DDT (and ancillary technologies, such as motor vehicles) proved to be necessary elements in the rapid elimination of malaria in Northwest Argentina, technology alone is not sufficient to explain this development. The campaign against malaria in Argentina had been organized for some forty years before the introduction of DDT; landscape-based "environmental sanitation" methods, combined with widespread distribution of quinine, had made significant advances against the disease, especially in urban areas of the Northwest; and malariologists in Argentina had developed considerable knowledge about the biology and microenvironmental behavior of the major regional vector, Anopheles pseudopunctipennis.
14 Moreover, public health policy had been politically prominent for several decades in Argentina; political will and organization was just as important to malaria eradication as the infusion of new technology. Except for the tool of DDT, then, Argentina's malaria campaign was largely "homegrown"; the Argentine case is an exception to the standard model of a technological -logistical package "exported" to the Third World for malaria eradication in the postwar era. 14. The most significant advances in study of the vector had occurred since the early 1930s, after a period of considerable disinterest, on the part of Argentina's sanitary authorities, in pursuing research on the vector; see Carter, "Development Narratives and the Uses of Ecology." This article also sheds light on the fascinating intellectual, social, and political history of public health in Argentina. To be sure, several works have examined the development of the modernizing ideologies and policies of scientific hygiene in Argentina, but generally only into the 1920s. 16 To that point, the debate on public health was shaped by a relatively small network of elite scientistbureaucrats, concerned with the role of hygiene and sanitation in socializing the urban masses. However, by the 1920s the political landscape in Argentina-in general and with specific reference to public health politics-became much more complicated and chaotic. As the liberal oligarchy's comfortable hold on power diminished, the messy business of class-based electoral politics became more prominent.
17 In the realm of public health, investing in sanitation, hygiene, and disease control for the sake of economic development would be overshadowed by popular agitation for comprehensive promotion of social welfare. Perón would bring a measure of order out of this political chaos; moreover, he understood, more than any leader before him, how to work public health policy to his own political advantage. Few historians have analyzed the genesis of Perón's public health policies, although recent work by Karina Ramacciotti portrays sanitary policy under Perón neither as revolutionary nor as a rejection of the moralism and elitism of liberal ideas of scientific hygiene, but rather as a sometimes contradictory constellation of ideas with definite historical antecedents. 16. See, for example, Diego Armus, "El descubrimiento de la enfermedad como problema social," in Nueva historia Argentina, tomo 5: El progreso, la modernización y sus límites In the next section of the article, I explore how Perón and his chief aide, Ramón Carrillo, developed the "new public health" ideology in the 1940s. I then turn to a discussion of the convergence of sanitary organization, national politics, and technological innovation that led to the great campaign to eradicate malaria in Argentina's Northwest, starting in 1947. In the final section, I detail the swift action of the campaign and the effect it had on the society and environment of the Northwest. P E RÓ N, CA R RI LLO, AND THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH Perón's public health policy, while innovative in many respectsparticularly in the sometimes spectacular character of its execution-represented a convergence of diverse ideological threads that characterized social debate in Argentina since the early 1900s. These often contradictory political impulses included conservative nationalism, the scientific construction of biological races, the revaluation of the figure of the criollo (Creole) of the interior as the basis for national identity, and use of social justice as a rationale for state interventions to promote public health.
19 Argentina was also influenced by the social welfare politics of Europe and the humanitarian ethos of the post-World War II era, reflected in the charter of the United Nations, which institutionalized the notion that health was a basic "human right" and that states should be responsible for the health and well-being of their citizens. Under the leadership of Perón and Carrillo, all of these diverse streams of thought coalesced in the concept of "social justice," which featured a stronger state role in protecting a more broadly defined concept of national public health. The Peronist project of social justice meant to spread and redistribute the fruits of wealth and modernity to improve Argentina-the national organism-as a whole. This program was put into operation through specific policies tailored to appeal to Ramacciotti, "Las voces que cuestionaron la política sanitaria del peronismo (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) ," in Las políticas sociales en perspectiva histórica, ed. Daniel Lvovich and Juan Suriano (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2006).
19. Historically, in Argentina the term "criollo" has been used to refer to people of mainly Hispanic (mixed Spanish-indigenous) descent, who maintain language, customs, livelihoods, and political outlooks distinct from the European immigrants (and their descendants) that flocked to Argentina after the late nineteenth century.
Perón's key constituencies (the unionized, industrial working class and the rural poor) and to antagonize his political opponents (the much-vilified oligarchy).
20
Ramón Carrillo was the principal organizer of Perón's program of public health. Like Carlos Alvarado, a native of Jujuy province, Carrillo came from Northwest Argentina, and these common roots helped cultivate a friendship as well as a shared interest in the health problems of their home region. Born in 1906, two years after Alvarado, to a prominent family of Santiago del Estero, Carrillo demonstrated a keen intellect, inchoate humanitarianism, and a passion for social justice.
21 Even as a teenager, he demonstrated a precocious interest in social justice and questioned Argentina's regional inequalities in wealth, health, and welfare.
22 As a young physician, Carrillo lamented the profound "cultural and technological dependency" of Argentina, the cause of which was simple: "we have taught ourselves to see ourselves in the mirror of Europe or the United States, to envy the dominant empires and to be ashamed of our Hispanic-Creole origin."
23 Thus Carrillo foreshadowed one of the fundamentals of Perón's nationalism, namely the desire for scientific and technological self-sufficiency, the search for "Argentine solutions" to Argentine problems. Carrillo rose rapidly within the medical profession, becoming Chair of Neurology at the University of Buenos Aires at the age of thirty-six.
20.
Stepan, "The Hour of Eugenics"; Ramacciotti, "Las huellas eugénicas en la política sanitaria Argentina (1946 Argentina ( -1955 Changing political circumstances would allow Carrillo to enter the realm of public health policy. Soon after Carrillo assumed his prestigious new post, Juan Domingo Perón, then an army colonel, took part in the coup that initiated a military government, in June of 1943. 24 This regime used force and repression to provide for "social order." The government censored the press; intimidated and dismissed dissident academics at the national universities, including Bernardo Houssay, a friend to Carlos Alvarado and supporter of the RF; incited anti-semitism; abolished political parties; claimed mystical or sacred political legitimacy as "defenders of the faith" for the Catholic church; and fomented paranoia about a possible U.S.-backed invasion by Brazil.
25 Perón participated in all of this, but as historian José Luis Romero has remarked, he also began to put "a more subtle plan" for seizing power into action.
26 Perón tied his political fortunes to establishing relationships of patronage with the country's labor unions. From his position as Labor Secretary in the military junta, Perón negotiated lucrative contracts for the unions; historians have interpreted this generosity as either a preventive measure against the infiltration of communism or a clever way of co-opting labor politics. Regardless of his motives, however, Perón was undoubtedly building a solid and loyal political base among the masses, especially poor criollo migrants from the Interior flocking to Greater Buenos Aires.
27
Perón made "social justice" a central feature of his populist rhetoric, and he conveyed his concern for the welfare of the masses through flamboyant demonstrations of state benevolence. With the irreplaceable assistance of his legendary wife Eva, Perón elicited not simply the loyalty but also the adulation of the masses of humble descamisados ("the shirtless ones"). Perón, once nearly forced out of the governing junta by increasingly suspicious and jealous officers, was elevated to the position of indisputable leader by the mass constitutional reform of 1949) Carrillo began to implement the principles of Peronism in matters of public health. In a series of public addresses and publications in the late 1940s, Carrillo proclaimed, developed, and explained the Peronist public health doctrine. Drawing on diverse sources of inspiration-such as previous generations of Argentine hygienists, the eugenics movement, nineteenth-century Cuban nationalist José Martí, Roosevelt's New Deal, papal encyclicals, the British National Health plan, and the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to name just a few-Carrillo postulated a socially broad view of health. He defined health in the same expansive terms as the new World Health Organization did in 1946: "as a state of complete physical, social, and mental well-being, and not just the absence of conditions or illnesses."
33 Carrillo argued that medical science had become increasingly microscopic in a search for the causes of disease, but in so doing, "could not see the forest for the trees" and "had forgotten the 'macrocosmos,' that is, the social environment."
34
Improvement of social conditions, such as higher salaries, better nutrition, better housing, and so forth, could have greater impacts on health than purely medical interventions.
35 Echoing the sentiments of turn-of-the-century hygienists, such as Emilio Coni, Carrillo proposed that social policy and sanitary policy were inseparable, and the traditional distinction between "private" and "public" hygiene should become obsolete, since the state had a vested interest in, and natural authority over, the health of its subjects.
36
Within the national imaginary of public health and welfare, the government's view included a special role for the people of the interior provinces. If the public health ideology of Carrillo and Perón had an archetypal subject-that is, an idealized recipient of the state's humanitarian aid-it was the impoverished, forgotten, rural criollo of the Northwest. This figure, who suffered under malnutrition, infectious diseases, "starvation wages," and social dislocation, became the "descamisado" whose migrations swelled the outskirts of Buenos Aires and the ranks of Perón's party. 37 The idea that people could live under such conditions in a country of such wealth appalled the Peronist conscience, not simply as a question of basic human rights, but also because this dissonance made a mockery of the idea of a unified nation. "It is no secret that in this land of such abundance and prosperity," wrote Carrillo in 1949, "a third of our people do not eat enough to live in health."
38
One-fifth of the country's population, located in the rural interior, lived "in the prehistory of hygiene and social medicine."
39 Carrillo, echoing Perón, wondered, What good were the wonders of modern medicine, such as penicillin or vaccines, if there were no doctors, nurses, hospitals, clinics, and ambulances to take it to the people who needed it? For Carrillo and Perón, then, the public health problems stemmed not from a lack of development per se, but an unequal (and sometimes irrational) distribution of medical and sanitary services. 37. Many in Buenos Aires, particularly those descended from European immigrants, labeled these migrants from the interior as "cabecita negra" (little black head) or simply "negros" (blacks). These pejorative terms were meant to insult the relative "darkness" of the criollo. Because race politics in Argentina is both contentious and largely unexplored, academically, I prefer not to elaborate too much on this. See Hodges, Argentina, 1943-1987: The National Revolution and Resistance, 31; Hugo E. Ratier, El cabecita negra (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1972); Luna, Perón y su tiempo, 1:29.
38. Carrillo, Política sanitaria argentina, 1:102. 39. Ibid., 1:168. 40. The moral critique of inequalities in health and social welfare that Carrillo and Perón developed drew on a long tradition in Argentine social thought. In fact, it followed a long line of writing on sanitation and public welfare going back to the parliamentary debates over the establishment of the national malaria service, the case for which was built, in part, on the severe inequality between the Northwest and Buenos Aires. The desire to resolve inter-regional imbalances in health had prompted many proposals to create a centralized national sanitary or public health authority, such as that proposed by the Radical legislator Leopoldo Bard in 1923. There was also a long line of muckraking journalism, often written by politicians and/or commissioned by the government, meant to expose the appalling conditions of the working class in the interior and particularly the Carrillo believed that eugenics, public health, and social welfare could elevate the criollo to his rightful place within the national society. As did many contemporary nationalists, Carrillo located the wellspring of national identity in the interior provinces rather than the morally corrupt metropolis. He held up the criollo of the interior as the model of authenticity, vigor, and strength-the basic material for the development of an ideal Argentine race. In 1940, at the First National Conference on Population, Carrillo proposed that an important demographic shift was occurring. Foreign immigration no longer accounted for most of Argentina's population growth, and natural growth rates in Buenos Aires and other cities of the Pampas had also declined. In the northern provinces, however, there was "a great capacity for fertility" with an average of three to five children per couple; given this, the people of this region served as a key population "reserve" for the entire country.
41 Carrillo later extended this idea to include rural communities of the interior, generally, calling them "the biological reserves of the nation," and further argued that sustaining the reproductive power of the rural poor through improvements in public health guaranteed the labor necessary for the continuing process of industrialization in the large cities.
42 In his inaugural address as Secretary of Public Health in 1947, he proposed the establishment of an "Institute of the Argentine Man" to study the "ideal, somatic, visceral, and psychological biotype that we must approach to be able to say one day, proudly, that we have a healthy and strong people." 41. Museo Social Argentino, Primero congreso de la población (Buenos Aires: Museo Social Argentino, 1941), 377 -78. Cited in Ramacciotti, "Las huellas eugénicas en la política sanitaria argentina," 316.
42. Carrillo, Política sanitaria argentina, 167. 43. Carrillo, "Conferencia Inaugural del Sr. Secretario de Salud Pública con motivo de la iniciación de los cursos de la Escuela de Biotipología y Ciencias afines, 1 de abril de 1947," Archivos de la Secretaría de Salud Pública, 1947, 1, 6-13; Carrillo, Plan esquemático de salud pública (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) ) (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1974), 4:29, cited in Ramacciotti, "Ideas y prácticas que confluyeron en la política sanitaria del primer peronismo," Ciclos en la historia, la economía y la sociedad, 2004, 27, 93.
With Perón's support, Carrillo began to implement his ambitious plan for public health, with uneven results. The construction of general hospitals and clinics increased the number of hospital beds and expanded availability of medical care. Laboratories administered by the government increased production of vaccines, serums, and other drugs. A national health census was conducted in 1954, and the government promoted hygiene and nutrition through radio broadcasts and public exhibitions. Investment in vaccination programs and campaigns to control endemic diseases helped to reduce incidence of smallpox, diphtheria, goiter, and malaria.
44
In sum, Perón and Carrillo significantly expanded the state's role in providing for the health and welfare of its citizens. This was evident in the more prominent position of public health administrators within the government, increased investment in health from the public purse, and the integration of health concerns into a broader, redistributive political platform of "social justice." The partisanship of Perón's populist politics should not overshadow the coherence of Carrillo's public health ideology, which offered moral, biological, sanitary, demographic, and economic rationales for protecting Argentina's masses. Reflecting his own origins, and the ideology of nationalists like Perón, Carrillo felt a special duty to provide for the rural poor of the interior provinces, and especially the Northwest. At the same time Perón, who understood the propaganda value of bold and massive demonstrations of benevolent state power, promoted "great campaigns" to bring rapid improvement to public health and welfare. This propagandistic motive, along with a patriotic concern for the "forgotten" citizens of Argentina's interior, help to explain the special urgency of the malaria eradication program that Perón, Carrillo, and Carlos Alvarado launched in 1947, detailed in the following section. increasingly precarious. Political intrigues within the rancorous military regime, in which Perón was still battling for supremacy, worried him. Alvarado was not a nationalist, nor a Peronist, nor even a Radical, but rather an old-fashioned conservative in the traditional mold of Jujuy politics.
45 His political worldview made him something of a relic and, potentially, a dissident. 46 Alvarado complained to his friend Lewis W. Hackett that the director of national health, Dr. Manuel A. Viera, had surrounded himself with his clinician friends, men with little interest in public health and limited knowledge of infectious disease.
47 In September, Alvarado and his staff abstained from attending the first National Conference on Public Health in Buenos Aires, organized by Viera, and Alvarado anticipated his imminent firing.
48 Hackett remarked in his diary that Alvarado "may lose his position at any moment because of his political opinions."
49 Adding to his difficulties, the malaria campaign itself experienced a serious setback in 1945, with a sharp recrudescence of the disease after years of steady decline. 50 It is noteworthy that in the midst of this turmoil and disappointment, Hackett also made casual reference to a question Alvarado asked of him: what was the going price for DDT?
51 Clearly, Alvarado was still attending to his duties.
Alvarado's rapidly deteriorating situation took an unexpected and auspicious turn on 17 October 1945, the milestone day that mass 45. This political orientation was typified by Benjamín Villafañe, a major public figure and elected official in Jujuy in the early twentieth century. Villafañe consistently railed against the corrupting ways of the metropole (Buenos Aires) and celebrated the authentic, traditional, and agrarian qualities of Jujuy and the rest of the Northwest.
46. In an interview with Martine and Jorge in the early 1980s, Alvarado remarked that he took pride in never singing the Peronist anthem at public events-he only mouthed the words. Nevertheless, he and Perón appear to have gotten along well. Eduardo H. Martine and Raul A. Jorge, "Se acabó el chucho: Carlos Alberto Alvarado y la lucha contra anó-feles," Todo es Historia, 1983, 17, 80 -82. Since Alvarado had no connection to the party, he would not rise to challenge Carrillo. In any case, after having served directly under the president of the National Department of Hygiene in the early 1930s, Alvarado had lost interest in seeking higher political posts.
54
He clearly relished directing the Malaria Service.
Under the new administration, Alvarado initially maintained the prevailing strategy of malaria control, even as he directed experimental control efforts using DDT from 1945 to 1947. The federal government's malaria campaign had been launched with great ambition in the first decade of the 1900s. 55 At first, to promote agricultural and urban development, malaria control strategy focused on the reclamation of marshes and other areas of standing water.
56 Through the early 1930s, Argentina's malaria service found this strategy, known as saneamiento, or "environmental sanitation," validated by Italy's successful campaign to combat malaria and promote rural development through wetland reclamation. 57 In 1934, however, Alvarado demonstrated through field experiments in Jujuy that the saneamiento strategy was mostly ineffective in Argentina, because the principal local vector, Anopheles pseudopunctipennis, differed considerably from malaria-carrying mosquitoes in Italy and other countries. Instead, Alvarado advocated a program known as "foci patrol" that targeted only the breeding areas for this species. As chief of the Malaria Service, he also introduced an ecological understanding of anopheles mosquitoes; managed to increase budgets and the number of full-time personnel; instituted a system of labor that was synchronized with the temporal cycles of A. pseudo biology; and developed a system of geographical zonation that used campaign personnel and equipment more efficiently. As a result, the prevalence of malaria in the Northwest had declined steadily even before the introduction of DDT, especially in urban and peri-urban areas.
58
After Perón became president in 1946, Alvarado drafted a plan for malaria control (known to insiders as Plan 46) that was incorporated into Carrillo's five-year national sanitary plan, detailed in the massive volume Analytical Plan for Public Health.
59 Plan 46 entailed substantial new investment (10,000,000 pesos between 1947 and 1951) to gradually expand the coverage of foci patrol, in combination with increased dispensation of quinine and general improvements in medical treatment. In Plan 46, Carrillo-probably borrowing liberally from Alvarado's original report-argued for a holistic and integrated understanding of malaria: "Malaria as a social fact is the result of a series of factors: biological, climatic, economic, and political; as a result, without approaches and solutions that correlate all such factors, it is not possible to achieve an integrated focus and solution to the problem."
60 This view was evident in a diagram 60. Ibid., 2:785 (emphasis mine). Historian Karina Ramacciotti (pers. comm.) points out that Carrillo let subordinates compose most of the sections of the enormous Analytical Plan, so Alvarado was likely responsible for the section on malaria.
that showed how the "biological fight" (lucha biológica) against malaria served as the central node of a whole suite of environmental improvements, including afforestation of riparian zones and stocking of streams with fish that fed on mosquito larvae.
61 This integrated, ecological framework for malaria control reflected Carrillo's broad and multi-scaled view of public health policy.
In
62 During World War II, with Italy as the principal proving grounds, DDT was used widely as an insecticide, first in the "successful delousing of Naples" (in 1944) and then against anopheles mosquitoes for malaria control (an effort that was spearheaded by the RF and its officers serving in the Allied army).
63 House spraying with DDT proved to be incredibly effective against mosquitoes, and by 1946 DDT was employed in malaria control, at least on an experimental basis, in Sardinia, the southern U.S., and parts of Latin America (Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama).
64 As Edmund Russell discusses in his book War and Nature, DDT also became almost instantly popular as a household and agricultural insecticide after the war.
65 When Alvarado began experimenting with the insecticide, he apparently had never observed DDT-based control efforts, but gleaned what he could from published articles and conversations with the RF's representative in Argentina, Lewis Alvarado, aware of DDT programs in other countries, decided to change targets, from larval to adult mosquitoes, which would require intensive house spraying. He turned to the private sector for help. The Ledesma company was a familiar contributor to, and beneficiary of, the Malaria Service's efforts. This massive sugar plantation in Jujuy province, which employed thousands of workers during the harvest season (zafra), was the largest private supporter of the Malaria Service, beginning in the 1930s. Typically, the company would lend its workers and donate materials to the Malaria Service to conduct sanitation-related labor on the plantation and adjacent mill towns. Other sugar mills and large enterprises in the region (such as the government-owned oil company, YPF) also offered such support. As historian Daniel Campi suggests, the sugar mills of the Northwest increasingly took on such obligations, and looked after the health of workers, to guarantee the productivity and reproduction of their labor force. In addition, provincial governments, labor unions, and prominent social critics applied pressure to mill owners to provide for the safety and health of their workers. gasoline engine, a pump, pulverizing machines, tanks, and small, hand-held sprayers, similar to those used by house painters, along with three or four peons to assist in the spraying. 69 The company agreed to help, and house spraying with DDT began in September.
While the trials in Ledesma were ongoing, Alvarado traveled to Caracas, Venezuela in January of 1947 for the Panamerican Sanitary Conference, and subsequently to Panama, Mexico, Cuba, and Peru, where he was able to observe firsthand the effectiveness of house spraying for mosquitoes with DDT.
70 After his Latin American tour, and observing that the trials in Ledesma were already showing positive results, Alvarado decided to scrap foci patrol and devote the Malaria Service's resources almost entirely to a strategy based on elimination of adult mosquitoes with DDT. As a larvicide, Alvarado commented, DDT was "just another chemical" with no great advantage over Paris green or petroleum. However, when used against adult mosquitoes, "DDT is not just another weapon in the malaria campaign, it is a revolutionary factor in the strategy, methods, and techniques of the fight."
71 In 1947, Hackett remarked that "Alvarado is shutting the door on the past" and "staking everything on DDT."
72 Starting in March of that year, Alvarado convened regular meetings of his regional directors to elaborate a DDT-based campaign. Around that time, Alvarado traveled to Buenos Aires to confer with Carrillo. Alvarado proposed spraying houses at threemonth intervals, and promised coverage of 40 percent of the 69. Letter from Carlos Alvarado to Hermino Arrieta, 27 July 1946, personal collection of Jobino Pedro Sierra Iglesias, San Pedro, Jujuy, Argentina.
70. Sierra Iglesias, Carlos Alberto Alvarado: Vida y obra, 274. 71. Carlos A. Alvarado and Héctor A. Coll, "Organización y resultados de la Campaña Antipalúdica que realiza la Dirección General de Paludismo y Enfermedades Tropicales del Ministerio de Salud Pública de la Nación," in Primera reunión Panamericana sobre enfermedad de chagas y primera reunión conjunta de la sociedad Argentina de patología infecciosa y epidemiología de Buenos Aires, y la sociedad Argentina de patología y epidemiología de las enfermedades transmisibles del norte Argentino y primera exposición de enfermedades transmisbles y difusión sanitaria, 10 al 16 de Julio de 1949 (Tucumán: Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, 1951), 3:6 (emphasis mine).
72. LWH Officer's Diary, 15 June 1947. Later, Fred L. Soper recounted this incident, which may well be apocryphal: Alvarado, to make a point about "shutting the door on the past" literally conducted a "public burial" of the tools employed in the larvicidal phase of the campaign. J. Austin Kerr, ed., Building the Health Bridge: Selections from the Works of endemic area the first year, and 80 percent by the end of the second year, 1948. Alvarado was proposing a colossal effort, with hundreds of workers covering over seventy-five thousand houses every twelve weeks, over an area of 150,000 km 2 . To accomplish this would require an infusion of cash and equipment, especially motor vehicles for rapid mobilization of the DDT "brigades."
By endorsing Alvarado's radical plan, Carrillo was taking a great risk: the Perón administration, though powerful, was still quite new, and Carrillo had other ambitious plans for public health, detailed in his Analytical Plan and public speeches, such as establishing a network of hospitals and clinics, integrating hygiene into the regular school curriculum, promoting proper childhood nutrition, and reforming the care of the mentally handicapped. Alvarado himself had never undertaken anything like such a massive effort, but then again, there was really no precedent for a national-scale malaria eradication campaign anywhere in Latin America. If Alvarado's gamble should fail, it could embarrass the government and jeopardize other projects. But Carrillo had "blind faith" in his old friend, and offered him complete support. Together, they went to Juan Perón. Alvarado later recalled giving a twenty-minute presentation, complete with tables, charts, and maps. After a brief round of questioning, Perón was convinced. He turned to Carrillo and said, "Give this kid anything he asks of you." 74 Alvarado, only nine years younger than Perón, may have later exaggerated the casualness of their exchange, but indeed Perón and Carrillo gave their full endorsement, and with their commitment assured, eradication of malaria became more than just a theoretical possibility.
Carrillo and Perón may have perceived that the enormous propaganda potential of the eradication campaign outweighed other political risks. Some observers compared Perón's propaganda machine to that of fascist Italy, where every great act of the populist government, especially its assistance to the poor and the sick, presented an advertising opportunity. A cynical Lewis W. Hackett, The thing that strikes me as familiar after my years in Italy under Mussolini is the prodigious advertisement of each new plan which the group in power conceives to impress the people and which is launched with spectacular ceremony -the 60 day campaign to lower the cost of living, the heavy industry program (without iron or coal), the declaration of economic independence, Evita's farewell to 'her' descamisados, the cavalcade of 90 trucks loaded with hospital supplies to succor the people of the provinces, the new holidays [. . .] The common people watch this kaleidoscope as spectators. They no longer have to worry, or think or act in their own behalf.
75
Through the "great campaigns"-which included programs to eradicate trachoma and tuberculosis, massive vaccination efforts, and rat eradication in Buenos Aires-Perón sought to demonstrate that the power of the state, including its military might, could be harnessed to massively and swiftly deliver services for humanitarian ends.
76
Carrillo, for his part, had a more subtle motive for heavy investment in malaria control. He wanted to address persistent infectious diseases first in order to move on to what he saw as more fundamental issues of social welfare, such as improving working conditions, nutrition, child-rearing, and education for Argentina's lower classes. While he sometimes painted a fearsome picture of infectious disease, at other times he was dismissive of their danger. He believed that modern medical science and sanitary technology offered easy means of eliminating these diseases, making them little more than nuisances, but in the absence of social organization and political will, they persisted.
77 Thus he hoped to eliminate diseases such as plague, tuberculosis, and malaria swiftly, through massive and decisive campaigns, so that health policy could prioritize confronting broader and more complex issues of social welfare. 75. LWH Officer's Diary, 26 July 1947. Hackett frequently took a jaundiced view of Argentine politics, and the relationship between his office and Perón was "sour and tense" even before Perón rose to power (Marcos Cueto, pers. comm., 12 November 2006). The relationship really deteriorated after Houssay and other RF-supported scientists were ousted from public universities for taking an anti-Peronist stance. Cueto, "Laboratory Styles in Argentine Physiology."
76. Karina Inés Ramacciotti, "Las sombras de la política sanitaria durante el peronismo: Los brotes epidémicos en Buenos Aires," Asclepio, 2006, 58, 115 -38.
77. Carrillo, Política sanitaria Argentina, 165. 78. Ramacciotti, "Las sombras de la política sanitaria."
The monumental malaria campaign bore a striking and calculated resemblance to a military campaign, another reason why it might have appealed to Perón, who after all was a product of army training. Perón undoubtedly appreciated the militaristic flourishes of the proposed campaign. Moreover, new technology, especially military technology, captivated Perón.
79 Few scholars have analyzed the role of technology in Perón's ideology and policy, yet he spurred an increase in industrial output through Soviet-style five-year plans, continued the expansion of state-owned military industries, and sponsored a covert (and ultimately unsuccessful) effort to develop a nuclear power plant in Patagonia.
80 A malaria eradication "army" deploying the "weapon" of DDT fit well into this overall program.
The notion that the campaign represented a "war" on malaria was taken seriously by its participants; the war metaphor permeated the discourse of the campaign as well as its visual appearance and logistics. When he inspected the progress of the "great campaigns," Carrillo, who had no military experience other than his work in an army hospital, would don a khaki uniform and beret.
81 Carrillo saw the fight against infectious diseases as nothing less than a war:
Germs and microbes, this whole army of enemies, lie in wait for us, surround us, and blockade us everywhere -the air, soil, water, etc., -and try always to penetrate our organism and destroy it. Sanitary medicine has to combat, with precision, this powerful and invisible enemy. Unfortunately, the forces of this army are very well organized. Sometimes, better organized than the Ministries of Public Health, and they sometimes beat us in battle. For that reason, when an epidemic or endemic appears with all of its virulence, it is truly difficult to fight and defeat it, because the organization of microbes on the attack is better than 79. Paul Lewis has characterized Perón as a fascist (in the mold of Mussolini), and argues that fascists are fascinated by technology "because an industrial base is the sine qua non for military power and imperialism." Lewis, "Was Perón a Fascist? An Inquiry into the Nature of Fascism," 245.
80. Spektorowski has argued that Perón's "productionist" impulse was just as strong as his "social justice" philosophy. Spektorowski, "The Ideological Origins of Right and Left Nationalism in Argentina, 1930 -43." For more on the intrigues of an expatriate Austrian scientist developing Argentina's atomic capacity, see Mario A. J. Mariscotti, El secreto atomico de humuel: Cronica del origen de la energia atomica en la Argentina by (Buenos Aires: Estudio Sigma S.R.L., 1996).
81. Ramacciotti, "Sombras de la política sanitaria." our organization of defense against microbes. In this, just as in military strategy, the best defense is always to attack.
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Alvarado, too, had used military rhetoric and logistics even in the days of foci patrol. 83 Later, Alvarado would observe that spraying a house with DDT was simple, analogous to a "sniper" firing a "rifle." But if a "sniper" was sufficient for just one house, to spray the three-hundred thousand houses of the endemic area would require an "army."
84 Thus Alvarado set about creating an army whose weapon of choice was DDT, not bullets, bombs, or grenades. On a lighter note, but still demonstrating the prominence of the bellicose discourse, Alvarado commissioned the creation of a cartoon character, "Sergeant DDT"-part soldier, part DDT canister-for use in campaign publicity and to maintain the morale of his own staff (Figure 1) . 85 All of this verbal and visual rhetoric exemplifies what was becoming an increasingly prevalent modern perspective: technology could not simply control but annihilate the microbial and insect "enemies" of humanity, turning disease control into a "war on nature." recorded as fifty-eight trucks, twenty-two jeeps, and six tankers-at the end of World War II. 87 In a well-publicized spectacle, Perón and Carrillo watched as the caravan, manned by teams of doctors and soldiers, departed from the presidential palace for the Interior. 88 Alvarado's son Pedro, who was just a child at the time, later recalled the emotional day in June 1947 when the longawaited trucks arrived: "it was a caravan of something like 60 trucks -impressive -still painted in war colors. We waited in In Tucumán, the trucks were paraded around the main plaza of the city. Alvarado and his regional directors proudly posed for a newspaper photographer in front of one of their trucks.
90
With the addition of the trucks the key components were in place for the start of what would prove to be the decisive phase of malaria control. Alvarado had acquired a sure supply of DDT, contracting with the Geigy Company for 100 tons a year, at 5 pesos (US $1.25) per kg, to be manufactured in Argentina.
91 Pumps, hand-held sprayers, stainless steel tanks, protective masks and gloves were acquired for the spraying of DDT. The Malaria Service constructed tanks to store the kerosene that would hold the DDT in solution and the gasoline needed to run the trucks. The personnel, about 250 in total, were already in the service. Everything was ready to go and in working order, but these were merely the raw ingredients for a successful campaign. To spray thousands of houses at three-month intervals throughout the entire Northwest presented new logistical challenges. In the months that followed, Alvarado would show his knack for maintaining a strong yet flexible organization, and once again make good on his own maxim: an effective malaria campaign "should be militarily conceived and militarily executed." Carrillo's interest in making a bold statement in favor of public health, the prospect of an eradication campaign would likely have been neglected, or at least delayed. Yet at the same time, Alvarado had built a reputation-during the pre-DDT era-as a diligent researcher, public health administrator, and energetic organizer of collective effort, always under conditions of scarce financial resources. Alvarado's reputation helped assure Perón and Carrillo of the viability of the eradication effort, and all three would benefit from the spectacularly effective execution of the campaign. ERADICATION : P RAC TI CE AND IMPAC T Generally, scholars have emphasized how DDT revolutionized malaria control and portrayed the new phase of control as a decisive break with the past.
93 I believe that this perspective is mostly accurate but perhaps overstated. The basic underpinnings of Alvarado's new strategy represented a continuity of the general philosophy, if not the specifics, of the foci patrol model, which Alvarado himself called "the era of organization."
94 Many elements helped bridge the old and the new models: military-like planning, hierarchy, chain-of-command, and spatial strategizing; a division of labor that charged personnel with specific tasks and avoided repetition of effort; species-specific attention to mosquito biology; use of quantitative methods for rigorous confirmation of results; and meticulous cost accounting, predicated on the quest for always-greater efficiency. On the other hand, a DDT-based strategy created new requirements in terms of timing of effort, labor distribution, and supply. So while Alvarado carried over general concepts or attitudes from the old model, he also made specific and sometimes drastic changes to the campaign's organization. For example, within two years he eliminated all twenty-eight of the Sanitation Services, the units occupied with foci patrol, and suspended all works of sanitary engineering.
95
Alvarado superimposed a new system on the old one. In the new system, the basic unit of operation was the brigade (brigada), usually 94. Alvarado and Coll, "Organización y resultados de la campaña antipalúdica," 6. 95. Ibid.
consisting of five members (chief, driver, and three operators) aboard the all-important truck. Each brigade covered a demarcated zone, within which it was responsible for the spraying of each and every home over a set schedule, and mobilized from a base, which was meant to serve as supply depot, repair shop, meeting place, and domicile-not unlike an army base. Many of these bases were built on the fly while the campaign was underway, by improvising structures out of scrap materials. Staff on the base provided logistical support for the brigades working in the field. Alvarado reported that there were 250 men "on the battle front"-that is, in the brigades-"and an equal number in the rearguard." 96 Alvarado took great pride in the complex and comprehensive supply chain he developed to keep operations moving.
97 With dedetización (literally, "DDT-ization"), as in military logistics, timing was everything: failure to spray houses at planned intervals, usually three times a year, could allow for re-infestation. A network of forty-four primary and secondary bases (expanded to fifty-two the second year), connected and serviced by support personnel, served to ensure that the whole operation would run like clockwork.
98
The scope of this new organization was impressive, and there were also important differences in practice between the old foci patrol services and the new dedetización brigades. In foci patrol, each malaria service operator spent most of the day working alone, responsible for controlling mosquito breeding areas in his own zone; in dedetización brigades, teamwork was fundamental. Alvarado had originally justified the labor system of foci patrol because he felt that it was the criollo preference to work alone, and Alvarado feared that the new approach would require "a difficult job of psychological conversion" of these laborers.
99 By all accounts, however, the workers adapted well to their new circumstances. The two strategies also differed significantly in their respective key spaces of labor activity. The foci patrol units tended to move in urban (or peri-urban) spaces while focusing on what were mostly natural environments (albeit modified by humans), such as springs, creeks, and seepage areas of river beds. Their main task, the search for anopheles mosquito larvae, never took them inside the home. The work of DDT brigades was quite different. As the focus of control shifted completely from mosquito larvae to adults, domestic spaces (sometimes peri-domestic spaces as well, such as stables or barns) became the exclusive locus of activity. At the same time, however, dedetización brigades were more likely to be assigned to remote, rural areas than to cities and their suburbs. To reach remote places in their zones, brigades had to deal with the difficulty of driving along muddy, unpaved roads, and crossing swollen streams. For the most inaccessible and mountainous zones, brigades often shifted to more nimble jeeps and, when necessary, relied on horses, mules, or their own feet.
100 Thus a focus on house spraying did not signify the end of contact with "raw nature" for DDT brigades.
Chemically, DDT differed from other insecticides both in its high toxicity to insects and its unique action. DDT was a residual spray: that is, its effective action continued long after spraying. Brigades sprayed a solution of 5% DDT dissolved in kerosene on walls, and after the kerosene evaporated (this occurred almost immediately), DDT crystals continued to hold to the surface, in an amount of about 2 grams per square meter.
101 This invisible residue, and its effectiveness against insects, would last for three to six months.
102 Since DDT was not a fumigant (an aerosol "bomb"), it did not repel insects from entering homes. As it happened, the habits of A. pseudopunctipennis, the local vector that Alvarado understood thoroughly thanks to his earlier and ongoing research, made it particularly vulnerable to the effects of DDT. For one, it was highly anthropophilic and domestic, tending to bite people in their homes, generally while they were asleep at night. Moreover, after taking a blood meal, the female A. pseudo tended, almost always, to 100. Alvarado and Coll, "Organización y resultados de la campaña antipalúdica," 9. 101. Sierra Iglesias, Carlos Alberto Alvarado: Vida y Obra, 196. This is similar to the amount of DDT employed in other countries at the time.
102. The more impervious surface, the longer the residual effect lasts, even for as much as one year. On permeable surfaces such as adobe, the effect is much shorter-lived. Herbert Michael Gilles, D. A. Warrell, and Leonard Jan Bruce-Chwatt, Bruce-Chwatt's Essential Malariology, 3rd ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1993), 220 -21.
repose immediately on a nearby wall, where the digestion of the blood meal began. Since DDT almost always killed mosquitoes on contact, by attacking the insect's nervous system, the chances of a mosquito surviving multiple visits to houses sprayed with DDT was practically nil.
103
Over the course of months, DDT spraying reduced A. pseudopunctipennis densities in treated locales to nearly zero, and before the effectiveness of the DDT wore off completely, another round of spraying would take place.
104 With the mosquitoes effectively eliminated (for as long as the spraying lasted), the cycle of malaria transmission would be broken. Barring the introduction of new human cases from outside, locales could become free of malaria. Thus DDT was unlike the insecticides of old: as Gordon Harrison commented, it was "in action rather like a vaccine applied to the environment to make it unsuitable for the transmission of parasites."
105 Alvarado, for his part, saw the whole project as having little to do with malariology: he considered the application of DDT little different in method from the application of spray paint.
106 For this reason, once he had established the norms of dedetización, he placed a civil engineer, Luis Silvetti Peña, in charge of the whole operation.
107
The other key institutional component of the DDT strategy was the Servicio de Vigilancia, or Monitoring Service. Confident in the effectiveness of DDT, Alvarado transformed the mission of the old quinine dispensaries, which for more than thirty years had attended to the majority of malaria patients in the endemic zone. By the middle of 1948, about ten months after spraying had begun, the dispensaries were receiving fewer than one thousand patients per month (by comparison, in the preceding decade, consultations had ranged from five thousand to almost twenty-five thousand per 103. Alvarado and Coll, "Organización y resultados de la campaña antipalúdica," 8; National Pesticide Telecommunications Network, "DDT Fact Sheet," National Pesticide Telecommunications Network, http://npic.orst.edu/factsheets/ddtgen.pdf (accessed 25 March 2005).
104. Alvarado and Coll, "Organización y resultados de la campaña antipalúdica," 8. 105. Harrison, Mosquitoes, Malaria, and Man, 227. 106. Sierra Iglesias, Carlos Alberto Alvarado: Vida y obra, 287. 107. Ibid.; Silvetti Peña, "Desarrollo y método de la actual lucha antipalúdica en la República Argentina." month).
108 Alvarado recognized that the success of DDT was leaving doctors, nurses, and other dispensary staff with time on their hands, so he remade these clinics, now called Puestos de Vigilancia or Monitoring Stations, into the key nodes of the new Monitoring Service. Personnel had two major new responsibilities. First, the Monitoring Service was charged with checking recently sprayed houses for the presence of mosquitoes. Second, and more importantly, these monitors were responsible for epidemiological surveillance: they had to investigate and treat each new suspected case of malaria within their zone. The very possibility of having such a service was proof of DDT's success, since for the first time, malaria incidence had been reduced to such negligible levels that it was feasible to investigate every single case of the disease.
The main purpose of these surveillance activities was to provide data to test the effectiveness of the DDT program. In the first half of 1949, only 134 malaria cases were registered in the whole area covered by the campaign. Of these, 76 (or about 57%) were patients whose homes had not received DDT spraying at all. While this number was negligible, Alvarado used the figure to expose the major fault of the campaign, the failure to diligently spray every house, as well as other problems, such as DDT whose effectiveness wore off too quickly or the difficulty of spraying houses made of traditional materials, such as sticks, thatch, and mud. Surveillance also revealed that in a few cases, the acts of residents themselves undid the work of DDT, for example, by covering sprayed surfaces with mud or plaster, or by sleeping outside.
109
The work accomplished by the DDT program in its first few months was nothing short of impressive. Between 1 September 1947 and 17 April 1948 the Malaria Service sprayed 170,235 houses in the endemic zone, in the process consuming about 43 tons of pure DDT, and almost 1,000,000 liters of kerosene and gasoline.
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The DDT sprayed in this time covered 22,543,000 m 2 of interior 108. Alvarado and Coll, "Organización y resultados de la campaña antipalúdica," 10. 109. Ibid.; C. A. Alvarado, H. A. Coll, and S. F. Laguzzi, "El programa de erradicación del paludismo en la República Argentina. Las fallas de la campaña de dedetización y la organización del servicio de vigilancia," Boletín de la Oficina Sanitaria Panamericana, 1950, 29, 1-6. 110. Silvetti Peña, "Desarrollo y método de la actual lucha antipalúdica en la República Argentina." surfaces (i.e., over 22 square kilometers) and brigades had covered a distance of over 168,000 km.
111 Such figures add to the story of the endgame of malaria control, but in another sense, the numbers themselves are the story. Published reports by Alvarado and other officers of the Malaria Service began to read more like civil engineering reports than public health work, and the disease itself practically left the frame of reference, which instead had cost accounting squarely at its center. Alvarado argued that in the era of foci patrol, precise economic calculations had been complicated and elusive because of the very heterogeneity and complexity of nature, represented by the criadero, or mosquito breeding area. With DDT, however, the breeding ground is substituted by a person's house, a homogeneous unit, easily accessible and measurable, where in general a basic formula of treatment is sufficient: that is, to apply 2 grams of DDT for every square meter of surface. This revolutionary change in technique also revolutionizes administration, since it permits the calculation of the cost of a national malaria campaign, with as much ease and precision as one calculates the cost of the construction of a road, a dam, or a twenty-story building.
112
Even before the campaign proper began, Alvarado had used elaborately calculated cost projections in his proposal to Carrillo and Perón, and as DDT work continued he refined these models, essentially building formulas to predict the cost of a campaign. These formulas relied on factors that were more or less constant (e.g., the estimated 2 grams of DDT per square meter, number of personnel in a brigade, cost of material needed to equip each brigade, etc.) and many variables (the number of inhabitants of a malarious zone, housing density, labor costs, supply costs) to figure out precisely how much labor, material, and time would be required for a campaign, as well as its bottom-line cost.
113 These models could also be used to compare the cost-effectiveness of DDT spraying vis-à-vis other techniques, though by the late 1940s the superior economies of DDT became practically self-evident. Why did Alvarado's discourse increasingly take a turn toward mathematics and accounting, and away from malariology, biology, and sanitation? For one, he was convinced of the extraordinary potential of DDT in the context of an efficient campaign. As a result, he believed that Argentina's experience could serve as a universal model for malaria control. In the 1930s, in the context of rejecting the Italian influence, Alvarado had cautioned against the international transfer of malaria control techniques, arguing that it was essential to understand the biology, ecology, and behavior of specific mosquito vectors.
114 In Argentina, he had once contended, the uniqueness of A. pseudo required uniquely Argentine solutions. While Alvarado did not abandon this position completely, he saw DDT as leveling the differences between mosquito species (since it was effective against all domestic mosquitoes) and, as such, the closest thing to a universal weapon against malaria. Alvarado was not alone in thinking this, of course, as the international meetings of the PASB became something of an echo chamber for the supremacy of this perspective.
115 Given that the efficacy of DDT as a chemical was becoming rapidly accepted in the malariology community, Alvarado may have perceived that his greatest contribution would be to elaborate norms for efficiently delivering DDT, and this project depended on the language of accounting. There are other, more subtle reasons for this turn, however. Alvarado had always railed against the obtuseness of Argentina's obstructionist government administrators, and viewed careful accounting as his defense against the arbitrariness of bureaucracy. Finally, while Perón and Carrillo granted vast sums to the great campaign, perhaps obviating the need for good bookkeeping, Alvarado had other responsibilities besides malaria control.
116 Carrillo gradually expanded the purview of the Malaria Service, extending it into control of other diseases (such as Chagas' disease) and expanding its geographical scope. The burden of these other projects may have 114. Carter, "Development Narratives and the Uses of Ecology." 115. Franco Agudelo, El paludismo en América Latina, 132 -34. 116. Since the 1930s, Alvarado and his Malaria Service had engaged in work against other diseases including typhus, yellow fever, small pox, goiter, trachoma, and hookworm. With the dissolution of the old malaria service and the creation of the new agency Digesnorte, the responsibilities of his office widened even further. been another reason for Alvarado's close attention to the costs of the campaign.
How did the public react to this campaign at the time? Apparently, the public viewed the campaign favorably, but firsthand accounts are scarce. Tulio Ottonello, a businessman and local historian from Monteros, Tucumán province, related to me that there was "no resistance" to DDT spraying, which began when he was ten years old.
117 DDT spraying was beneficial not only for reducing malaria incidence, but also for eliminating all kinds of insect pests. The public may have perceived this incidental outcome as one of DDT's principal merits. DDT spraying for malaria control coincided with another of Perón's ambitious programs, the aerial spraying of insecticide to eliminate locusts on crops.
118 During this time, according to Ottonello, "there wasn't a single insect."
119 The public assisted in this war on insects by purchasing widely available DDT-based products, sold under such brand names as "Pestroy" and "Nebulair."
120
In rare instances, the work of the Malaria Service provoked emotional reactions. In 1950, Alvarado recounted how one woman in rural Catamarca had conveyed her gratitude for the campaign a few years earlier. Alvarado and other officials of the Malaria Service were inspecting the work of one dedetización brigade, which they had followed, on foot, to an isolated canyon. After learning that Alvarado was in charge, an old woman approached him, and said: I'm over ninety years old, sir; during my long life I've listened to promises from politicians and government people, and I've heard stories from many others, but they never came to our house to bring any benefit or to leave us with any improvement, up to now; thanks to what these men are doing, our life has changed, especially that of the poor women, mothers and wives, who spend our lives at home. Now we enjoy a great benefit; we can live and sleep peacefully, without having to think constantly about fleas, bedbugs, lice, or mosquitoes, and above all, because our children have ceased suffering from malaria. That's why I ask that you allow me to kiss your hand in gratitude.
Alvarado deflected her praise and gave Perón the credit for the campaign. All the woman could say in response was "God bless General Perón."
121
As this anecdote implies, the eradication campaign encountered little public opposition. Historically, government programs of disease control have provoked resistance, due to the highhandedness of state officials, cultural differences, perceived racism, and denials of civil liberties. Cueto, for example, has explored the causes of such resistance in Peru and Mexico.
122 If anything like this occurred in Argentina's malaria eradication program, it was never mentioned in the hundreds of newspaper articles and other documents I reviewed, or in the many interviews I conducted. There are probably many factors behind the relative lack of resistance, but I speculate that the mass popularity and adulation of Perón facilitated the labor of the Malaria Service. Alvarado was also known for maintaining good relations with rural people of the Northwest, and it's also possible that effective eradication took place so rapidly that "resistance" to the campaign never had time to develop.
As a result, Perón and Carrillo easily made political capital out of the success of the malaria eradication campaign. While the results of the campaign were indeed dramatic, and even more than promised, the government's propaganda tended to exaggerate the severity of the malaria problem before the DDT campaign began, thereby 121. It is hard to accept this anecdote completely at face value. Alvarado told this story as part of a speech on the role of Perón's social justice doctrine in public health, to a class at the University of the Littoral, in Santa Fe. According to Sierra Iglesias, Alvarado, who was not a Peronist, tried to avoid giving such a speech but eventually relented. In the speech, Alvarado may have sarcastically overstated his admiration for Perón. But if the story contains at least a grain of truth, it speaks volumes about the way that Perón was able to deliver his political message through "great works" carried out by a powerful state, which had the ability to reach into the remotest corners of the country. Carlos Alberto Alvarado, "Justicialismo en el saneamiento urbano y rural," paper presented at Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1950, cited in Sierra Iglesias, Carlos Alberto Alvarado: Vida y obra, 520 -21. overstating how much malaria had declined after DDT. Carrillo, for example, boasted that the number of cases of malaria had declined from 300,000 in 1946 to 137 in 1949. 123 The first number seems to be far off base but unfortunately became widely disseminated in propaganda. The official statistics of Alvarado's Malaria Service (which recorded patients visiting the service's clinics or quinine dispensaries) account for only 87,853 cases in 1946, dropping to 3,164 cases in 1949; from 1937 to 1950, in no year did this figure exceed 165,000 cases.
124 Carrillo also claimed that by eliminating malaria in the north, over two million work days had been saved, equivalent to 40,000,000 pesos a year in salary; because the campaign cost only 4,000,000 pesos in three years, Argentina had "made a magnificent bargain."
125 (More recently malaria scientists have admitted that these calculations of economic "savings" through malaria control are frequently exaggerated.
126 ) Public health propaganda also used extreme rhetoric to describe the severity of malaria before Perón; the 1950 book The Argentine Nation: Just, Free, Sovereign, a massive compendium of the Perón government's early accomplishments, included a reproduction of a propaganda poster entitled "One Less Enemy" (referring to malaria).
127
The poster's text proclaims that malaria was once an "obsession" for Argentina, a "terrible, implacable enemy" of health. The graphics of the poster accentuate such claims, with an outline drawing of the "rebel mosquito" appearing to threaten the entire country. Interestingly, there are no people in the poster; the heroes of the campaign appear to be the famous army surplus trucks. This propaganda seemed to fulfill its purpose, as Perón was given more than his due credit for executing the campaign. Even Félix Luna, a historian and critic of Perón, declared that the success of this campaign alone almost (but not quite) made up for all of the other errors of his government. 128. Luna, Perón y su tiempo, 1: 404.
CO N C LU S I O N
There is a saying among many public health professionals in Argentina: "malaria was eradicated by decree." 129 Indeed, in July 1949, less than two years after the massive DDT spraying effort had begun, and while there were still sporadic cases of malaria in the country, Perón issued a presidential decree that abolished the Malaria Service (by then, known as the Division of Malaria and Tropical Diseases). His logic was simple: because malaria had been eradicated from Argentina, the agency no longer served a purpose.
130 In its place, this decree created a new agency, the General Directorate of Sanitation for the North (known by its Spanish abbreviation, Digesnorte), still headed by Alvarado. Carrillo formed this and other regional health agencies, as part of his plan to expand the effective power of the federal government over public health. Despite the decree of "eradication," Digesnorte continued to attend to malaria eradication, maintaining control in malaria-free zones and snuffing out sporadic outbreaks of the disease. In reality, malaria has never left Argentina, not completely. The Malaria Service continues to operate today, employing a model of the malarious environment, along with a strategy that continues to depend on house spraying for adult mosquitoes, that are legacies of the 1940s, long outlasting Perón, Carrillo, and Alvarado.
In the years that followed, the architects of malaria's demise in Argentina met different fates. By the end of 1955, Perón was overthrown in a military coup and sent into exile. A year later, Carrillo died of complications from a cerebral hemorrhage in Belém, Brazil. He, too, had been forced into exile, but by rivals within the Peronist party in October of 1954.
131 By that time, his hopes for a comprehensive overhaul of national public health had been suggests another reason why it was fortunate that malaria was eradicated so quickly: in the first few years of his presidency, Perón gave Carrillo considerable latitude to carry out bold experiments in public health planning. After 1950, Carrillo was increasingly marginalized within the government and control over public health policy was usurped by Eva Perón, who channeled government largesse through her eponymous Foundation. Carrillo lacked the political clout to follow through on most of his initiatives in the 1950s.
131. Alzugaray, "Ramon Carrillo o la salud pública." frustrated, due to budgetary issues, political intrigues, and a geographically uneven implementation of policy (working to the disadvantage of the impoverished Interior). 132 Alvarado was much more fortunate. Beginning in 1950, Alvarado served as an advisor to malaria eradication campaigns in other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, under the auspices of the PASB. 133 At the end of 1954, sensing that Carrillo's ouster had complicated his own professional and political situation, Alvarado sought a way to leave Argentina on his own terms. In November, Alvarado accepted an offer from Fred L. Soper, director of the PASB, to become a permanent consultant on malaria control in the Americas, and he relocated to Mexico City, and later, Washington, D.C. From 1959 to 1964, Alvarado served as director of the World Health Organization's global malaria eradication program, in Geneva, Switzerland.
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The experiences of a long career changed Alvarado's outlook on major aspects of malaria control. In the 1930s, he had cautioned against the transfer of malaria control models between countries with different environmental, social, and political circumstances; in the 1950s and 1960s, as a leader in international malaria policy, Alvarado helped enforce the eradicationist perspective, with wellknown, tragic consequences. (It should be noted, however, that Alvarado's views were not completely orthodox: for example, he argued that continued entomological research and epidemiological surveying remained important in the secondary phases of eradication campaigns, while Soper believed that DDT had made these activities mostly superfluous.
135 ) Yet Alvarado would discover that the success of his campaign in Argentina was hard to duplicate in other countries. In this article, I have argued that the eradication of malaria in Argentina from 1945 to 1949, or at least its reduction to miniscule levels of incidence, was the product of three convergent factors: sanitary organization, technology, and strong political support for public health. The inability to consistently unite these three elements in other countries may provide a partial explanation for the failure of the eradication model internationally.
This article has also suggested ambiguous links between malaria eradication and ecological perspectives on the disease. Carrillo and Perón's sanitary policy was expansive, comprehensive, and coherent, favoring measures to address the systemic causes of ill health. At the same time, the work of Alvarado and international malaria scientists had developed the ecologically informed concept of species sanitation, with nuanced and complex understandings of the malarious environment. This perspective, being necessarily species-specific, was also eminently place-specific; in other words, malaria control strategies were not interchangeable across different malarial regions. Yet Alvarado, seeing the opportunity that DDT presented, put these "ecological" perspectives aside in favor of the "magic bullet" concept of DDT. Alvarado's framework for malaria control became increasingly reductive and mechanistic.
136 Within his community of domestic and international malaria scientists, single-minded devotion to DDT was becoming "dogma." 137 Alvarado's changing ideas reflected trends in malaria control worldwide, but in some ways he was ahead of the curve: the success of the DDT-based campaign in Argentina, along with triumphs in Sardinia and the southern U.S., encouraged overconfidence in the wonders of DDT.
Although Argentina's malaria eradication campaign fit uneasily into the organicist and holistic public health ideology that Carrillo best articulated, it was easily linked to another element of Perón's program, the expression of state power through military might. As we have seen, the campaign, which started soon after World War II, was full of bellicose rhetoric, both visual and verbal. The mosquito was the clear "enemy"; eradication teams were "brigades"; DDT sprayers were "snipers"; they were part of an "army"; and "supply columns" backed the troops on the "front line." Reciting these 136. To be sure, at times Alvarado would revert to the rhapsodic language of an earlier era, predicting that the elimination of malaria would lead to increased agricultural productivity and colonization. But he reserved such talk for addresses to the general public, and his words so nearly mimic the rhetoric of the early 1900s that they hardly seem genuine. Alvarado, "Conceptos sobre el nuevo plan de lucha antipalúdica de la Secretaría de Salud Pública de la nación. Transcript of Radio Broadcast, Radio Tucumán, 12 November 1947," 22.
137. Spielman and D'Antonio, Mosquito, 157.
metaphors does not convey, however, how deeply a martial mentality permeated the campaign. DDT, a chemical "born" in World War II, and war surplus trucks served as the key technologies for the campaign. Alvarado organized the malaria campaign as a general would prepare for war. Military-style strategies and especially logistics were indispensable to the eradication effort. By this time, framing malaria eradication as a "war" on insects was completely normal, internationally. 138 In Argentina, Perón's military training, imperial ambitions, and fascist style of leadership imbued this kind of rhetoric with heightened realism.
In the postwar era, the use of DDT in a "war on nature," to eliminate insects-whether as agricultural pests, disease carriers, or domestic nuisances-had serious environmental repercussions and served to inspire the formulation of an influential ecological critique of modernity, most famously in Rachel Carson's 1964 book Silent Spring. Within the community of malaria science and policy, the global pursuit of a DDT-based eradication strategy into the late 1960s has been the cause of great regret: in many parts of the world, anopheles mosquitoes developed resistance to DDT insecticides, and this ineluctable biological phenomenon, coupled with the breakdown of public health systems in the developing world, fostered a global recrudescence of malaria since the 1970s. 139 To many, the error of the eradication perspective lies in its disconnection from ecological reality, and many have lamented the rupture between "humanity" and "nature" that DDT symbolizes. In response, a new generation of medical scientists has adopted an ecological framework, to argue that "Humans and microbes are not 'at war'; rather, both parties are engaged in amoral, self-interested, coevolutionary struggle."
is somewhat different: as demonstrated by Carlos Alvarado's foci patrol strategy, this viewpoint is circumscribed and works at a miniscule scale: his idea was to "think like a mosquito," to understand its biology and its habits.
I conclude that Alvarado found the first idea, that of an "ecological perspective" in public health, as attractive but impractical for malaria control in the short-to medium-term. Alvarado, a pragmatist above all else, saw that quick, direct, decisive action against malaria was the best route to take, and left it to people such as Carrillo to develop high-minded ideas about social justice and the systemic roots of sanitary problems. While using DDT, Alvarado never discarded the knowledge he had attained through an ecological science perspective on malaria. His understanding of mosquito behavior, gained from previous experience with foci patrol, served him well in the DDT program. Ultimately, whose ideas had more influence? Carrillo's or Alvarado's? Carrillo's visionary exposition of Peronist sanitary philosophy, in the end, was mostly left on paper. Its impact on "social justice" in Argentina, or on the development of a "sanitary consciousness" is hard to gauge. Alvarado's accomplishment owed much, as I have said, to the energy that Perón and Carrillo brought to public health policy, but that did not really translate into malaria control strategy. We might say that Alvarado's social vision was less ambitious and all-encompassing, but his accomplishment, while modest, was greater. All of the grandiose ideas about malaria control in Argentina since the 1890s-its connections to developing the Northwest, attracting foreign immigrants, making agricultural landscapes productive, creating a more productive and civilized working class-had little impact on the disease. Alvarado's reductionist strategy set aside such concerns and accomplished in two years what all of those sweeping ideas could not: the elimination of malaria.
